ISLAMABAD: The rapid advance of the Houthis in Yemen has changed the security situation around the Bab al-Mandab Strait and created an early strategic challenge for the recently signed Makkah Joint Defence Agreement between Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and Pakistan.
The Houthis’ reported capture of Perim, also known as Mayun, Island in the Bab al-Mandab has given the group a strategic position near one of the world’s key maritime chokepoints.
The situation has become more significant after reports that the Houthis intend to keep the waterway open to international shipping while excluding Saudi vessels.
This development has raised questions about whether deliberately blocking Saudi shipping through Bab al-Mandab could constitute an armed attack on Saudi Arabia under the Makkah Agreement.
It has also raised questions about what Pakistan’s response could be as a signatory to the agreement.
Makkah Agreement Faces Early Test
Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and Pakistan signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement on August 7.
The agreement states that an armed attack against any one of the three countries will be considered an attack against all.
Pakistan’s Foreign Office has described the agreement as defensive in nature. It aims to strengthen collective deterrence against external aggression.
The agreement also refers to the right of individual and collective self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
The developments around Bab al-Mandab could therefore become an important test of how the new defence arrangement would operate in practice.
Strategic Importance of Bab al-Mandab
Bab al-Mandab links the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.
The waterway is important for international trade because shipping between Asia and Europe relies on routes connecting to the Suez Canal.
Any prolonged disruption could affect energy prices, insurance costs and global supply chains.
The situation is particularly sensitive because the Strait of Hormuz is already facing severe disruption.
Bab al-Mandab has consequently become an important alternative route for Saudi oil exports to Asian markets.
The Houthi advance could threaten that alternative route as well. The reported capture of Perim Island gives the group a strategic position from which it could threaten maritime traffic through the strait.
Potential Impact on Saudi Shipping
The reported distinction between international shipping and Saudi vessels is also significant.
A broad threat against maritime navigation could be presented as an attempt to deter military intervention or influence international policy.
However, deliberately targeting Saudi vessels would represent a more direct form of pressure against the Saudi state.
For Riyadh, the threat could therefore involve both its territory and infrastructure, as well as maritime access to important Asian markets.
Whether such actions would constitute an armed attack under the Makkah Agreement would depend on their nature and scale.
The agreement does not state that every hostile act, economic measure or threat automatically triggers collective military action.
The situation could be different if Houthi forces attacked Saudi commercial vessels with missiles or drones, seized Saudi ships, mined international waters or systematically used force to prevent Saudi vessels from exercising freedom of navigation.
Such actions could provide Saudi Arabia with stronger grounds to invoke collective self-defence under the agreement.
Pakistan’s Possible Response
The agreement does not necessarily mean that Pakistan would automatically send combat troops to Yemen.
Pakistan has described the Makkah Accord as a framework for collective defence and deterrence.
Its response could depend on the nature and scale of any attack. Possible measures could include intelligence sharing, surveillance, air-defence assistance, protection of Saudi infrastructure and maritime security cooperation.
Other options could include naval deployment, logistical support or direct military action if circumstances warranted it.
Diplomatic Challenge for Islamabad
Pakistan could also face a major diplomatic challenge if the situation escalates.
The Houthis are closely aligned with Iran. Direct Pakistani military action against the group could therefore be viewed in Tehran as indirect participation in a confrontation involving Iran.
Pakistan maintains close political, economic and defence relations with Saudi Arabia. At the same time, Iran is Pakistan’s immediate neighbour, and Islamabad has sought to maintain constructive relations with Tehran.
Islamabad would therefore face the challenge of supporting Saudi Arabia while avoiding a wider confrontation with Iran.
Maritime Security Concerns
Pakistan also has a direct economic interest in maintaining freedom of navigation through Bab al-Mandab.
Trade between Pakistan, Europe and the Middle East depends heavily on secure maritime routes.
A prolonged closure or selective blockade could increase freight, insurance and energy costs for Pakistan.
Such an economic shock could add pressure at a time when Pakistan is already seeking to manage its external economic challenges.
The situation therefore presents a complex dilemma for Islamabad.
Pakistan is committed to Saudi Arabia under the Makkah Agreement. However, it also has an interest in avoiding another open-ended conflict in Yemen and preserving workable relations with Iran.
The developments around Bab al-Mandab could become an early test of Pakistan’s ability to balance its defence commitments, maritime interests and diplomatic priorities.
The writer is a former ambassador of Pakistan to Iran and the UAE. He is also a former special representative of Pakistan for Afghanistan and currently serves as a senior research fellow at the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI).
